David Johnson, Covert Operations: Indonesia 1965
Gestapu: The CIA's "Track Two" in Indonesia
By David Johnson, 1976
[October 1995 note from David Johnson: This is a paper I wrote in 1976.
It is presented here in its original version. It was written to encourage
Congressional investigation of the issue by the Church Committee at the
time. This paper was circulated privately but never published. It may have
some enduring merit. Comments and criticisms are welcome.
As evidence that the subject matter is still relevant, please note this
recently declassified quotation:
"From our viewpoint, of course, an unsuccessful coup attempt by the PKI
might be the most effective development to start a reversal of political
trends in Indonesia."
Then-US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones
March 10, 1965
Chiefs of Mission Conference, Baguio, Philippines
Quoted in Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, "Subversion as Foreign
Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia," 1995, p.225]
David T. Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20005
202-862-0700
djohnson@cdi.org
(* "Track Two" was the name given to a CIA covert operation undertaken
in Chile in the fall of 1970 at the direction of President Nixon. Its
purpose was to use all possible means to prevent Allende from assuming
the presidency. Knowledge of Track Two was very tightly held. The State
Department, the Defense Department, the American Ambassador in Chile,
and the Forty Committee were not informed. Track Two was partially
responsible for the murder of General Schneider, the Chilean Army
Chief of Staff who opposed efforts of other military officers to stage
a coup. Track Two failed in its objective in 1970. Other analogies to
the Indonesian events are the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the Reichstag
fire.)
Introduction
This paper presents the preliminary outline of a new interpretation
of the events in Indonesia in 1965 that climaxed in the "coup"
attempt of October 1st and the actions of the September 30th Movement
(GESTAPU). It is argued that the September 30th Movement was not an
action by "progressive" or dissatisfied middle-level military officers,
nor a creature of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), nor was it
stimulated by President Sukarno. GESTAPU was an instrument directly
in the hands of General Suharto (and probably General Nasution) [1995 note
from David Johnson: today I would delete the reference to Nasution] and
most likely a creation of the Central Intelligence Agency for the
purpose of "saving Indonesia from Communism" in a desperate situation.
GESTAPU served the crucial function of providing a legitimate pretext
for the drastic extermination of the PKI. It was calculated to put the
reins of power quickly into the hands of Suharto and to place Sukarno
in a restricted position.
GESTAPU worked. It is probably the most successful covert
operation that the CIA has ever carried out. The participation of the
CIA in GESTAPU--its "fingerprints on the gun"--cannot be proven unless
the Congress digs hard to find the truth, as was done partly in
the case of Chile. The CIA connection is hypothesized because it seems
a logical outcome of U.S. policy toward Indonesia and because of
the relative sophistication and complexity of the GESTAPU operation.
Because of the close contact between the Indonesian Army and U.S.
Defense Department advisers and attaches it is probable that certain
of these personnel were also involved.
It is not maintained that the thesis of this paper is necessarily
correct or proven. The author's hope is to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently plausible that further research along these lines will
be conducted by those more knowledgeable than he and that those in a
position to do something about it will begin to look into the secret
official record. The thesis is presented without a great deal of
hedging but the author is aware that many of the facts he uses are
open to a number of alternative explanations. Of course, many "facts"
are in dispute. This first draft assumes some knowledge on the part
of the reader of the basic events of the time and of the existing
interpretive controversy. No special attempt is made here, however,
to refute alternative theories. Only a portion of the supporting material
is indicated.
President Lyndon Johnson meets with U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green.
